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Abstract
The Logic of Proofs LP captures the invariant propositional properties
of proof predicates t is a proof of F with a set of operations on proofs
sufficient for realizing the whole modal logic S4 and hence the intuitionistic
logic IPC. Some intuitive properties of proofs, however, are not invariant
and hence not present in LP. For example, the choice function ‘+’ in LP,
which is specified by the condition s:F ∨t:F → (s+t):F , is not necessarily
symmetric. In this paper, we introduce an extension of the Logic of Proofs,
SLP, which incorporates natural properties of the standard proof predicate
in Peano Arithmetic:
t is a code of a derivation containing F,
including the symmetry of Choice. We show that SLP produces BrouwerHeyting-Kolmogorov proofs with a rich structure, which can be useful for
applications in epistemic logic and other areas.
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Introduction

In [15], Gödel used the modal logic S4 to axiomatize classical provability and
provide the formal provability semantics to the intuitionistic propositional logic
IPC by reducing IPC to S4. The question of the provability semantics of S4 itself
was left open and found its resolution in [1; 2] via the Logic of Proofs LP1 which
provided a complete axiomatization of the proof predicate
t is a proof of F
∗ Dedicated to B.A. Trakhtenbrot on the occasion of his 85’th birthday. To appear in the
LNCS Festschrift series.
1 The first (incomplete) sketch of the logic of proofs was given by Gödel in one of his lectures
of 1938 [16]. This lecture was published only in 1995; by that time, the complete system LP
for the Logic of Proofs had already been discovered and shown to provide a desired provability
semantics for intuitionistic logic (cf. [1; 2]).
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in a propositional language with a sufficiently rich system of operations on
proofs. On the other hand, LP can realize every S4 derivation by recovering
corresponding proof terms at every occurrence of the modality (the Realization
Theorem from [1; 2], cf. Theorem 1). The combination of these two features
renders LP a bridge between intuitionistic logic and the realm of formal mathematical proofs in the style of Brouwer-Heyting-Kolmogorov:
IPC ,→ S4 ,→ LP ,→ Gödelian proof predicates.
In this diagram, IPC ,→ S4 denotes Gödel’s faithful embedding of IPC into S4
[15], S4 ,→ LP signifies the Realization Theorem which faithfully embeds S4
into LP [1; 2], and LP ,→ Gödelian proof predicates refers to the arithmetical
soundness (and completeness) theorem ([1; 2]) for the Logic of Proofs. We refer
the reader to [2] and surveys [6; 7] for detailed discussion of these matters.

2

LP Basics

The Logic of Proofs has three basic operations on proofs: Application ‘·’ (binary), Choice ‘+’ (binary), and Proof Checker ‘!’(unary). Proof polynomials
are terms built by these operations from proof variables x, y, z, . . . and proof
constants a, b, c, . . .. The formulas of LP are defined by the grammar
A = S | A → A | A ∧ A | A ∨ A | ¬A | t:A
where t stands for any proof polynomial and S for any sentence letter. As usual,
we shorten s · t to st when convenient. The binding priority from strong to weak
is !, ·, +, :, ¬, ∧, ∨,→ . In particular, t(u + v):F → tu:F ∨tv:F denotes
{[t·(u + v)]:F } → {[(t·u):F ]∨[(t·v):F ]}.
The postulates of the Logic of Proofs LP are
1. a fixed set of axioms for classical propositional logic with Modus Ponens
as its only rule of inference, e.g., the set from [18];
2. s:(F → G) → (t:F → (s·t):G)
(Application);
3. t:F → !t:(t:F )
(Proof Checker );
4. s:F → (s+t):F , t:F → (s+t):F
(Choice);
5. t:F → F
(Reflection);
6. Constant Specification Rule: If c is a proof constant and A is an axiom
from 1-5, then infer c:A.
LP is closed under substitutions of proof polynomials for proof variables and
formulas for propositional variables, and enjoys the deduction theorem.
Constant Specification CS is a set of formulas {c1:A1 , c2:A2 , . . .} where each
Ai is an axiom and each ci is a proof constant. Each derivation in LP naturally
generates a (finite) constant specification CS introduced in this derivation by
the Constant Specification Rule. By LPCS , we mean a subsystem of LP where
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the Constant Specification Rule is only allowed to produce formulas from a given
constant specification CS. If CS contains all formulas c:A where A is an axiom
and c is a proof constant, then LPCS is LP itself.
The principal feature of the Logic of Proofs is the Internalization Principle2
which states that
whenever ` F , there is a proof polynomial p such that ` p:F ,
which is nothing more than the explicit version of the modal Necesitation Rule
`F
` 2F.
The following Theorem 1 discloses a connection between the Logic of Proofs
LP and Gödel’s provability logic S4; this result has been crucial for providing
intuitionistic logic with the intended Brouwer-Heyting-Kolmogorov semantics
of proofs. This theorem shows that the provability modality in S4 can indeed
be read as
2F = there is proof of F
using the language of Skolem-style operations on proofs rather than quantifiers.
For example, a sentence
2F → 2G
in the logic of formal provability3 reads as
∃x(‘x is a proof of F’) → ∃y(‘y is a proof of G’),
whereas, by the Realization Theorem, this reads as an LP sentence
x:F → t(x):G,
for an appropriate proof polynomial t(x).
The usual Skolemization does not work for quantifiers on proofs, and a totally
new technique has been invented here.
Theorem 1 [Realization Theorem for LP ([1; 2])] There is an algorithm which,
given S4 ` F , substitutes each occurrence of the modality in F by an appropriate
proof polynomial such that the resulting formula F r is derivable in LP. Moreover,
such a realization can be made in a way that respects Skolem-style reading of
2X as ‘there is a proof of X’: each negative occurrence of 2 can be realized by a
proof variable, and each positive occurrence of 2 is realized by a proof polynomial
depending of those variables.
The size of realizing proof polynomials can be limited by a quadratic function
in the length of a cut-free derivation of F in S4 ([12]). A semantical proof of the
Realization theorem which is not based on cut-elimination in S4 was suggested
in [14]. R. Kuznets in [12] showed that S4 cannot be realized in LP without
using self-referential proof assertions of the sort t:F (t).
2 In his brief sketch of the logic of proofs in [16], Gödel cited the Internalization Principle
as one of its features.
3 This approach led to the well-known Provability Logic GL (cf. [11; 27]).
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Corollary 1 S4 is the forgetful projection of LP.
Proof. It is straightforward that the forgetful projection of LP is S4-compliant;
it suffices to notice that the forgetful projections of all axioms of LP are provable
in S4 and the rules of LP are S4-sound. By Theorem 1, every theorem of S4 is
a forgetful projection of some LP-theorem.
2

3

Symmetric Provability Interpretation

The intended provability semantics of LP is given by interpreting t:F as the
arithmetical proof predicate
t is a proof of F,
where ‘proofs’ are understood in a multi-conclusional way, i.e., a proof can yield
more than one theorem (think of a Hilbert-style proof sequence that proves all
formulas occurring in this sequence).
A body of work in this area shows that proof realization of modality necessarily requires the multi-conclusion reading of proof predicates. What follows is
a light informal argument which hints at what is going on. Imagine a variant LP
of the logic of proofs capable of realizing S4. Then LP should be able to realize
the modality in an easy S4 theorem 2A where A is a propositional modal-free
axiom (e.g., P → (Q → P ) for propositional letters P and Q). Such a realization
should be of the form t:A for some proof term t and LP ` t:A. Assume that
LP is closed under the substitution of propositional formulas for propositional
letters; all provability logics have this feature since they describe schemas valid
under all arithmetical interpretations, and this property survives substitution.
Let A0 be a substitutional instance of A, syntactically different from the latter.
By the substitution closure, LP ` t:A0 . Hence LP ` t:A ∧ t:A0 and t represents
a proof of two different theorems.
Moreover, the logic of single-conclusion proofs contains some principles which
are inconsistent with modal logic. For example (cf. [2]), the principle ¬(x:> ∧ x:
(> ∧ >)) is valid for single-conclusion proofs whereas its natural modal language
presentation via the ‘forgetful projection,’ ¬(2> ∧ 2(> ∧ >)), is false in any
modal logic. The logic of single-conclusion proofs has been axiomatized in [10]
(without operations) and in [20; 21] (with the operations Application and Proof
Checker4 ). For further progress in this direction cf. [22].
In the context of the Logic of Proofs, one has to consider the whole class of
proof predicates and axiomatize only invariant properties, i.e., those that hold
for all proof predicates (from a given class). There is a good reason for this.
The language of the Logic of Proofs is rather expressive and captures individual
properties of proofs which should not count as general logic laws. For example,
the formula x : (> ∧ >) → x : > claims that any (multi-conclusion) proof of
4 The

operation Choice ‘+’ is incompatible with single-conclusion proof semantics
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the conjunction > ∧ > should prove > as well. Apparently, this ‘principle’ is
not invariant since by changing an axiom system, one can obtain two proof
predicates in which this formula both holds and does not hold, respectively.
The soundness and completeness theorems from [1; 2] state that the Logic
of Proofs LP captures exactly all invariant properties of multi-conclusion proof
predicates with natural computable operations on proofs corresponding to Application, Proof Checker, and Choice5 . We refer the reader to [3; 6; 7] for more
details.
In the rest of this section, we introduce a symmetric version of the standard
provability semantics for the Logic of Proofs which differs slightly from the one
given in [2], § 6 and is more convenient for revealing the natural structure of
proof operations.
Consider the proof predicate PROOF (x, y) for Peano Arithmetic PA which
is a natural arithmetical formalization of the usual Hilbert-style definition of
proofs:
x is a number of a proof sequence which contains a formula with a number y .
An interpretation of the language of LP maps propositional letters to sentences
of PA, and proof variables and constants to Gödel numbers of Hilbert-style
proofs in PA. This is the only difference between the symmetric semantics and
the standard provability semantics from [2], § 6, where proof variables and
constants are mapped to arbitrary natural numbers, and not necessarily the
codes of PA-derivations. Note that each proof sequence in PA is a complete
proof of each sentence occurring within it.
For the proof predicate PROOF (x, y) , s·t can be interpreted as the operation
which concatenates the codes of proofs corresponding to s and t and adds to
the right all formulas G such that for some F , F → G and F occur in s and t
respectively.
Here is a more formal description. Let s0 , t0 , . . . denote arithmetical interpretations of s, t, etc., i.e., Gödel numbers of Hilbert-style proofs in PA. Let
also ∗ denote the concatenation on Gödel numbers of finite sequences. Then we
define
(s · t)0 = s0 ∗ t0 ∗ pG1 q ∗ . . . ∗ pGn q
(1)
where pG1 q, . . . , pGn q are Gödel numbers of single-formula sequences for each
Gi for which there exists F such that F → Gi and F are in the proofs with the
numbers s0 and t0 respectively. For example, if s0 = pF → Gq and t0 = pF q,
then
(s · t)0 = pF → Gq ∗ pF q ∗ pGq,

(t · s)0 = pF q ∗ pF → Gq.

The Choice operation s+t can be interpreted as the concatenation of proof
sequences corresponding to s and t respectively:
(s + t)0 = s0 ∗ t0 .

(2)

5 E. Goris suggested in [17] a natural interpretation of LP in Bounded Arithmetic where all
of these operations are PTIME-computable.
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The Proof Checker is a primitive recursive operation that takes a proof t
and, for each F such that t:F holds, produces a proof of all such t:F ’s; such
an operation can be traced back to the proof of Gödel’s Second Incompleteness
Theorem (cf. [26]).
We call PROOF (x, y) with operations (1), (2), and Proof Checker as above
the symmetric arithmetical semantics of the Logic of Proofs.
We can see that within the standard semantics, the Choice function is symmetric:
(s+t):F ↔ (t+s):F ;
moreover, it satisfies the principles
(s+t):F ↔ s:F ∨t:F,
u(s+t):F ↔ (us+ut):F,
(s+t)u:F ↔ (su+tu):F.
None of these principles is derivable in LP. The point is that these principles
are not invariant! For example, one can easily devise an interpretation where
(s+t):F → s:F ∨t:F does not hold. Indeed, interpret s+t and s · t as follows:
(s · t)] = s] ∗ t] ∗ pG1 q ∗ . . . ∗ pGn q,
as in (1), and
(s + t)] = (s · t)] .
It is clear that s:F ∨t:F → (s+t):F holds, since (s+t)] contains the concatenation
of s] and t] . However, (s + t)] and (t + s)] can very well prove different sets of
theorems, cf. an example about (s · t)0 and (t · s)0 above. In this case, neither
(s + t):F ↔ (t + s):F nor (s + t):F ↔ s:F ∨t:F holds.
Under yet another interpretation:
(s · t)[ = s[ ∗ t[ ∗ pG1 q ∗ . . . ∗ pGn q,
as in (1), and
(s + t)[ = (s · t)[ ∗ (t · s)[ .
Choice ‘+’ becomes symmetric,
(s+t):F ↔ (t+s):F,
but (s + t):F → s:F ∨ t:F generally does not hold.

4

Justification and Epistemic Semantics

A formal justification semantics for LP was offered by Mkrtychev in [25]. This
helped to establish the decidability of LP ([25]), find complexity bounds ([23;
24]), and establish the disjunctive property of LP ([19]).
A Mkrtychev model is a pair M = (A, ), where
6

•

is the usual truth evaluation of propositional letters;

• A is an admissible evidence predicate A(t, F ) defined on pairs (term, formula). The intuition behind A is that A(t, F ) means
t is an admissible evidence for F.
The admissible evidence predicate respects operations on proofs, i.e., A
satisfies the natural closure conditions copied from the axioms of LP:
Application: A(s, F → G) and A(t, F ) implies A(s·t, G);
Proof Checker: A(t, F ) implies A(!t, t:F );
Choice: A(s, F ) or A(t, F ) implies A(s+t, F ).
Given a model, the truth relation
that

is extended to all formulas by stipulating

•

respects classical Boolean connectives;

•

t:F iff ‘

F and A(t, F ).’

For a given constant specification CS, a model M = (A, ) is a CS-model iff
A(c, B) holds for any c:B ∈ CS. It is an easy exercise to check, by induction on
derivations in LPCS , the soundness of LP with respect to Mkrtychev semantics:
If LPCS ` F , then F holds in each CS-model.
In particular, all formulas from CS are true in all CS-models.
We present here a different (from that shown in [25]) proof of the completeness theorem for LP with respect to Mkrtychev models by the standard
maximal completeness sets construction. Let W be the collection of all maximal consistent sets over LPCS . For each Γ ∈ W , we define the truth relation Γ
on propositional letters as
iff p ∈ Γ
Γ p
and the admissible evidence predicate as
AΓ (t, F )

iff

t:F ∈ Γ .

The aforementioned closure conditions on AΓ are obviously met. Let us check
Choice. Suppose AΓ (s, F ) holds. Then s:F ∈ Γ. Since s:F → (s+t):F ∈ Γ (as an
LP-axiom) and Γ is maximal consistent, (s+t):F ∈ Γ, too. Hence AΓ (s+t, F ).
Moreover, c:B ∈ Γ for all c:B from CS, by maximality and consistency of Γ.
Therefore, for each Γ, M = (AΓ , Γ ) is an LPCS -model.
The next step is to establish the Truth Lemma: for each formula F ,
ΓF

iff

F ∈ Γ.

Induction on F . The base case is given by the definition of the model. The
Boolean cases are straightforward. Consider the case when F is t:G. If t:G ∈ Γ,
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then G ∈ Γ as well, since t:G → G ∈ Γ and Γ is deductively closed. By the
induction hypothesis, Γ G. Moreover, AΓ (t, G) also holds, by the definition of
AΓ . Hence Γ t:G.
Now let t:G 6∈ Γ. Then AΓ (t, G) does not hold, by the definition. Hence
6 Γ t:G.
To finish the completeness theorem, it suffices to note that if LPCS 6` F , then
{¬F } is a consistent set. By the standard Lindenbaum construction, find its
maximal consistent extension Γ. Since ¬F ∈ Γ, F 6∈ Γ. By the Truth Lemma,
for AΓ and Γ , 6 Γ F .
There are several useful refinements of Mkrtychev semantics known:
1. Exact Evidence Model ([25]): For every model M = (A,
model M 0 = (A0 , 0 ) such that
• M and M 0 are equivalent, i.e., for each F ,
0

0

0

• A is exact, i.e., A (t, F ) iff

F iff

), there is a
0

F;

t:F .

2. Minimal Model ([19]): For each constant specification CS, there is an
exact evidence model M = (A, ) such that for each t:F , M t:F iff
LPCS ` t:F .
The minimal model theorem yields the Disjunctive Property ([19]):
LPCS ` s:F ∨ t:G iff ( LPCS ` s:F or LPCS ` t:G).
An epistemic Kripke-style semantics for LP was offered by Fitting [13; 14].
A Fitting model may be regarded as a Kripke model, each node of which is a
Mkrtychev model with a monotone admissible evidence function:
if uRv then Au ⊆ Av .
The new condition which specifies the truth of proof assertions at a given node
is as follows
u t:F

iff

Au (t, F ) holds and v F for every v with uRv.

Proper modifications of Fitting semantics can accommodate multiple modalities
and proof assertions and are playing a key role connecting the Logic of Proofs
with epistemic modal logics ([4; 5; 8; 9]).

5

Choice Function ‘+’ in LP

The operation ‘+’ which is called Choice, Union, Sum, or Plus indeed performs
something which can be described as choice. The behavior of ‘+’ is governed
by the logical principle
s:F ∨ t:F → (s+t):F,
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which states that ‘+’ takes two proofs s and t, at least one of which is indeed
a proof of F , and produces the output s + t, which is a proof of F . ‘Under the
hood,’ this operation chooses a proof of F between s and t.
The following theorem was established in [19]; it showed that the Choice
operation in LP is weakly symmetric and weakly equivalent to a disjunction.
Theorem 2 [19] For any constant specification CS, the following are equivalent:
1. LPCS ` (s+t):F
2. LPCS ` (t+s):F
3. LPCS ` s:F ∨ t:F .
Theorem 3 below shows that none of these properties hold in LP in a strong
sense, i.e., internally.
Theorem 3 Let x,y be proof variables and P a propositional letter. Then
1. LP 6` (x+y):P → (y+x):P
2. LP 6` (x+y):P → x:P ∨y:P
3. LP 6` x(y+z):P → (xy+xz):P
4. LP 6` (y+z)x:P → (yx+zx):P.
Proof. In principle, these statements could be proven by proper use of the
arithmetical counterexamples. However, since not all details about the provability semantics of LP were given there, we present a proof based on Mrktychev
models.
To establish (1), consider a Mkrtychev model M = (A, ) where
P
and A(t, F ) holds iff t is different from x, y, and y + x. To verify that M is
a legitimate model, it suffices to check the closure properties of A. The only
relevant case is Choice in a configuration when A(y +x, G) does not hold. In
this situation, neither A(y, G) nor A(x, G) holds, which does not constitute a
violation of the closure property of A. It is easy to see that in this model,
(x+y):P since both A(x+y, P ) and P hold. On the other hand, 6 (y+x):P
since A(y+x, P ) does not hold. Overall,
6 (x+y):P → (y+x):P.
Item (2) immediately follows from (1) since LP ` x:P ∨y:P → (y+x):P .
Item (3). Similar to 1. Consider a Mkrtychev model M = (A, ) where
P and A(t, F ) holds iff t is different from any subterm of xy + xz, i.e., t 6∈
{xy +xz, xy, xz, x, y, z}. The closure property holds since in all applicable
clauses when A can be false in the conclusion, the assumptions are also false,
by the definition of A. In this model, x(y +z):P is true since x(y +z) is not a
subterm of xy+xz, but (xy+xz):P is false.
Item(4) can be treated similarly to (3).
2
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6

Symmetric Logic of Proofs

As we have already discussed, the Logic of Proofs LP has two prominent features which determine its foundational significance: it has a natural provability
semantics6 , and it suffices for realizing S4, hence IPC, thus making LP a kind of
Brouwer-Heyting-Kolmogorov semantics for intuitionistic logic.
In this chapter, we introduce the Symmetric Logic of Proofs, SLP, extending
LP itself by postulating a property borrowed from the symmetric arithmetical
interpretation.
SLP has all the postulates of LP and one additional principle:
Symmetry Principle:
t(u+v):F ↔ tu:F ∨tv:F,

(3)

(u+v)t:F ↔ ut:F ∨vt:F.

(4)

Notational conventions: we assume that this principle also covers the case
when there is no multiplication by t at all, i.e.
(u+v):F ↔ u:F ∨v:F.

(5)

With this convention, the Symmetry Principle subsumes the Choice Axiom of
LP and hence may be considered a generalization of the latter.
Clearly,
LP ⊂ SLP.
Theorem 4 SLP is sound with respect to the symmetric provability interpretation.
Proof. We have to establish soundness of the Symmetry Principle.
Let us start with tu:F ∨tv:F → t(u+v):F . Fix the (symmetric arithmetical)
interpretation t0 , u0 , v 0 , F 0 of s, u, v, and F respectively and suppose that (tu:F )0
holds. By the definition of the symmetric arithmetical interpretation, at least
one of the following cases holds:
1. F 0 ∈ t0 ;
2. F 0 ∈ u0 ;
3. there is X such that X → F 0 ∈ t0 and X ∈ u0 .
In cases (1) and (2), F 0 ∈ [t(u+v)]0 , by the definition of the symmetric arithmetical interpretation. In case (3), X ∈ u0 ∗ v 0 , hence X ∈ (u + v)0 , hence
F 0 ∈ [t(u+v)]0 as well. The case when [tv:F ]0 holds is symmetric.
Let us examine t(u + v) : F → tu : F ∨ tv : F. Suppose F 0 ∈ [t(u + v)]0 . By
the definition of the symmetric arithmetical interpretation, at least one of the
following cases holds:
6 Moreover, LP provides a complete axiomatization of the class of all multi-conclusion proof
predicates.
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1. F 0 ∈ t0 ;
2. F 0 ∈ (u + v)0 , i.e., F 0 ∈ u0 ∗ v 0 ;
3. there is X such that X → F 0 ∈ t0 and X ∈ u0 ∗ v 0 .
In case (1), both (tu:F )0 and (tv:F )0 hold. In case (2), either F 0 ∈ u0 , and then
(tu:F )0 , or F 0 ∈ v 0 , and then (tv:F )0 . In case (3), either X ∈ u0 , hence (tu:F )0 ;
or X ∈ v 0 , hence (tv:F )0 . In any case, (tu:F ∨tv:F )0 holds.
The cases ut:F ∨vt:F ↔ (u+v)t:F and u:F ∨v:F ↔ (u+v):F are treated
similarly.
2
Theorem 5 SLP is closed under substitution and enjoys the Internalization
Property.
Proof. Trivial from the definition of SLP and the fact that no new rules of
inference were added to SLP as compared to LP.
2
Theorem 6 SLP enjoys the Realization Theorem with respect to S4.
Proof. Indeed, suppose F is derivable in S4. By the Realization Theorem for
LP (Theorem 1), there is a realization of F , F r by proof polynomials in the
basis {·, +, !} which is derivable in LP. Since SLP extends LP, SLP ` F r .
2
Theorem 7 S4 is the forgetful projection of SLP.
Proof. It suffices to note that the Symmetry Principle has forgetful projections
of the sort 2X ↔ 2X ∨ 2X, trivially provable in S4. By Theorem 6, every
theorem of S4 is a forgetful projection of some SLP-theorem.
2
These results, along with the provability semantics for SLP, show that the latter
gives a Brouwer-Heyting-Kolmogorov-style semantics for S4 and IPC as well.
IPC ,→ S4 ,→ SLP ,→ Gödelian proof predicates.
Theorem 8 Let CS be a constant specification. Let s ∼ t mean that for any
formula F , s:F ↔ t:F is provable in SLP with this CS. Then the following
holds:
1. s + t ∼ t + s (commutativity of Choice);
2. s + (t + u) ∼ (s + t) + u (associativity of Choice);
3. s + s ∼ s (idempotency of Choice);
4. t(u + v) ∼ tu + tv (left distributivity);
5. (u + v)t ∼ ut + vt (right distributivity).
11

Proof. All the derivations are in SLP.
1. (s + t):F → s:F ∨t:F → t:F ∨s:F → (t + s):F
2. [s + (t + u)]:F
3. (s + s):F

↔ s:F ∨t:F ∨u:F

↔ s:F ∨s:F

↔ [(s + t) + u]:F

↔ s:F

4. t(u + v):F

↔ tu:F ∨tv:F

↔ tu + tv:F

5. (u + v)t:F

↔ ut:F ∨vt:F

↔ ut + vt:F
2

Mkrtychev models for SLP are the usual Mkrtychev LP-models with admissible evidence predicates which respect the Symmetry Principle:
A(t(u + v), F ) iff ‘A(tu, F ) or A(tv, F )’

(6)

A((u + v)t, F ) iff ‘A(ut, F ) or A(vt, F )’

(7)

A(u + v, F ) iff ‘A(u, F ) or A(v, F ).’

(8)

Theorem 9 For each constant specification CS, SLP is sound and complete for
SLP Mkrtychev models.
Proof. Soundness of SLP is straightforward. We have only to check that
Symmetry holds in each SLP-model. Let us consider (3). Let t(u+v):F . Then
F and A(t(u+v), F ). By (6), A(tu, F ) holds or A(tv, F ) holds, hence tu:F
or tv:F . In either case, tu:F ∨ tv:F . The remaining clauses for soundness
are checked in the same manner.
Completeness can be established by a maximal consistent set construction as
in Section 4. One need only check that the canonical model (the set of maximal
consistent sets with A and
as in Section 4) is indeed an SLP-model. For this,
is suffices to check that for each maximal consistent set Γ, conditions (6), (7),
and (8) hold. Let us check (6).
Suppose A(t(u + v), F ) holds for this Γ. This means that t(u+v):F ∈ Γ.
Since t(u + v):F → tu:F ∨ tv :F ∈ Γ, by maximality of Γ, either tu:F ∈ Γ or
tv:F ∈ Γ, hence ‘A(tu, F ) or A(tv, F )’ holds for this Γ.
Now let ‘A(tu, F ) or A(tv, F )’ hold in Γ. Then either tu:F ∈ Γ or tv:F ∈ Γ.
By the Symmetry Principle (3), since Γ is deductively closed, t(u+v):F ∈ Γ,
which yields that A(t(u + v), F ) holds for this Γ.
The remaining clauses are checked similarly.
2
Fitting models for SLP are obtained from those for LP by adding conditions
(6), (7), and (8), respectively. The following theorem can be easily established
along the lines of Theorem 9:
Theorem 10 For each constant specification CS, SLP is sound and complete
for SLP Fitting models.
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Discussion

Note that Application in SLP is neither associative nor commutative since neither of these properties hold for the symmetric arithmetical interpretation (Section 3).
A natural attempt to add more ring structure to SLP by introducing a constant 0 for the empty derivation does not work well with the symmetric provability interpretation. In particular, t + 0 = t, but t · 0 is t rather than 0 here7 .
This could be fixed to t · 0 = 0 by bending the provability semantics a little.
However, under any modification of semantics, the identity ¬0:> holds, which
spoils the connection to modal logic. Indeed, the forgetful projection of the latter formula is ¬2>, which is false in any normal modal logic. This observation
alone should not discourage us from considering the addition of 0 to a version
of SLP, though. The language of proof polynomials should then be extended by
a special constant 0 which cannot be used as ‘c’ in the Constant Specification
Rule (Section 2). A new axiom schema ¬0:F should also be added.
Note that the relation ‘∼’ from Theorem 8 is an equivalence relation on proof
polynomials. However, ‘∼’ is not a congruence, e.g., s ∼ t does not generally
yield !s ∼!t. For example, x ∼ x + x (Theorem 8.3 ), but not !x ∼!(x + x).
Indeed, in the symmetric provability interpretation, !x should contain proofs of
x:F for all F ∈ x, whereas !(x + x) contains proofs of (x + x):F for all such
F ’s. This observation still leaves an opportunity for ‘∼’ to be a congruence in
some !-free variant of SLP. It is easy to check that in SLP, s ∼ t and u ∼ v yield
s+u ∼ t+v. It is not known whether the same holds for ‘·’, i.e., su ∼ tv as well.
Such a rule for ‘·’ is sound for the standard symmetric provability interpretation,
which suggests that a proper version of this rule either holds in, or can be safely
added to, SLP. Answers to these questions could lead to an adequate notion of
the equality of proofs in Justification Logic in general. We leave this, however,
for future studies.
Other natural steps in this direction would be to clarify the questions of
decidability and complexity for SLP, to check the disjunctive property, and to
describe adequate Gentzen and tableaux proof systems.
We conjecture that SLP is arithmetically complete with respect to the class
of proof predicates for which the Symmetry Principle holds. An intriguing
question remains open about the logic of proofs for the standard symmetric
provability interpretation.
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